Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code: Incriminating an innocent person

In Campanano v. Datuin (2007), the Supreme Court listed three:

1. The offender performs an act.
2. By that act, he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime.
3. The act does not constitute perjury.

The Court explained that Article 363 refers "to the acts of PLANTING evidence and the like, which do not in themselves constitute false prosecution but tend directly to cause false prosecutions."

Not by Article 363 alone. In Campanano, a person was accused under Article 363 for having filed a criminal complaint that the other side said was baseless. The Supreme Court held that Article 363 "does not, however, contemplate the idea of malicious prosecution", meaning someone prosecuting or instigating a criminal charge in court. The complaint for incriminating an innocent person was dismissed.

The law offers other tracks, each with its own rules:

It is a civil claim, not a crime under Article 363. In Marsman & Company v. Ligo (2015), the Supreme Court held that an employee who had been wrongly accused, arrested and prosecuted was entitled to damages for malicious prosecution. Quoting an earlier ruling, the decision listed four elements the plaintiff must prove: the prosecution happened and the defendant was the prosecutor or instigated it; the criminal case ended in an acquittal; the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and the prosecution was impelled by legal malice, meaning an improper or sinister motive. The quoted passage also notes that the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.