Tan-Andal v. Andal (2021): Psychological Incapacity Redefined

Rosanna and Mario married in Makati in December 1995. Their only child, a daughter, was born in 1996. They separated in 2000, and Rosanna kept custody of their daughter.

Rosanna described a husband who disappeared for days, could not manage money, used marijuana and shabu, took large cash advances from her construction firm until it could no longer pay its workers, and neglected their sick daughter. He escaped from or left drug rehabilitation more than once. Mario denied this and said it was Rosanna who was incapacitated.

Rosanna filed a petition to declare the marriage void under Article 36. She presented a psychiatrist who diagnosed Mario with a personality disorder and substance abuse disorder, but who never interviewed Mario himself, because he did not appear when invited.

The trial court in Parañaque declared the marriage void, gave Rosanna custody of their daughter and declared her the sole owner of the lot and house. The Court of Appeals reversed. It called the psychiatrist's report "unscientific and unreliable" because Mario was never interviewed, and declared the marriage valid. Rosanna appealed to the Supreme Court.

The main question was whether Rosanna proved that Mario was psychologically incapacitated. To answer it, the Court looked again at the 1997 guidelines in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, including whether the root cause must be medically identified and proven by experts. The Court also decided who owned the lot and the house, and who should have custody of the child.

The Supreme Court granted Rosanna's petition. It reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's decision.

On the law, the Court restated Article 36:

• Not a mental illness. The Court "categorically abandons the second Molina guideline". Psychological incapacity "is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion". What must be shown is the spouse's "personality structure", seen through clear acts of dysfunction that undermine the family.
• Ordinary witnesses are enough. People who were present in the spouses' lives before the marriage may testify about behavior they consistently saw. An expert is no longer required, although an expert opinion offered in evidence is still considered.
• Before the wedding. The incapacity must exist "at the time of the celebration" of the marriage, even if it shows only later.
• Incurable in a legal sense. The incapacity must be so lasting, with this specific partner, that the union can only break down. Medical incurability is not required.
• Serious. Mild character quirks, mood changes, occasional outbursts, and plain refusal, neglect or difficulty are not enough.
• Clear and convincing evidence. This is more than the usual proof in civil cases but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court tied it to the presumption that marriages are valid.

On the facts, the Court found that Rosanna proved Mario's incapacity. His drug use, his refusal to finish rehabilitation, bringing his child into a room where he used drugs, draining the family firm and failing to support his family showed incapacity that existed before the marriage. The Court added that drug addiction being a ground for legal separation does not stop a court from declaring a marriage void, if the addiction shows a psychological incapacity that already existed at the wedding.

On property, the Court applied Article 147 of the Family Code, which governs a void marriage between parties who could otherwise marry each other. Wages and salaries earned during the cohabitation are shared equally. But Rosanna's half of the lot was donated to her by her aunt, and the house was built with money that Rosanna and her father borrowed, with no proof that Mario helped or cared for the household. So Mario had no share in either.

On custody, the Court applied Article 213 and agreed that custody belonged to Rosanna, with Mario allowed to visit. It noted that the daughter had since reached the age of majority.

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 is a lasting incapacity rooted in a spouse's personality structure, existing at the time of the wedding, grave and incurable in the legal sense; it need not be a medically identified illness, expert testimony is not required, and it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Before Tan-Andal, many petitions under Article 36 depended on a psychological report that labeled a spouse with a personality disorder. The Court said this requirement was "restrictive, rigid, and intrusive" and pushed experts to "pathologize" spouses. Since 2021, a spouse can prove the case with testimony from people who knew the other spouse well before the wedding.

Tan-Andal did not create divorce. The incapacity must still exist at the time of the wedding, it must still be serious, and the proof must be clear and convincing. Problems that truly begin after the wedding are still outside Article 36.

The decision is long, with several concurring and separate opinions. Read the full text on the Supreme Court E-Library (link in the sources below) before relying on any part of it.