Garcia v. Drilon (2013): RA 9262 Is Constitutional

In 2006, a wife in Bacolod City asked the Regional Trial Court, acting as a Family Court, for a temporary protection order (TPO) against her husband under RA 9262. She filed for herself and for her minor children.

She said her husband was controlling, cut her off from her friends and had an affair. She described physical abuse during their fights, emotional and psychological harm, and threats to take the children and stop financial support. He controlled the family businesses.

The court issued a TPO and later renewed and changed it several times. Among other things, it ordered the husband to leave the family home, stay away from his wife and children, surrender his firearms and give financial support.

The husband did not raise any constitutional issue before the trial court. Instead, he went to the Court of Appeals with a petition for prohibition, arguing that RA 9262 was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals dismissed his petition, and he appealed to the Supreme Court.

The main question was whether RA 9262 is unconstitutional because it:

• favors women over men, against the equal protection clause;
• allows protection orders to be issued without notice and hearing, against due process;
• goes against the State policy to protect the family, because it does not allow mediation; and
• gives judicial power to barangay officials, who issue Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs).

The Court also looked at whether the husband should have raised these issues before the Family Court first.

The Supreme Court denied the husband's petition and upheld RA 9262.

• Wrong court, wrong time. The Family Court, as a Regional Trial Court, had the power to decide if the law is constitutional. The husband should have raised the issue in his opposition there. The Court added that the rules on protection orders do not allow petitions for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against interlocutory orders of the trial court, so the 60-day restraining order the Court of Appeals had issued against the TPO was improper. Still, because the question was new and important, the Supreme Court decided it.
• Equal protection. The Court held that the law "did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse". The classification rests on real differences: the unequal power relationship between women and men, the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence, and widespread gender bias and prejudice against women. It is related to the purpose of the law, covers future conditions as well, and applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence.
• Not only husbands. The law covers any "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman. The Court said this gender-neutral word covers even lesbian relationships.
• Due process. A court may issue a TPO ex parte, meaning before notice and hearing, because time matters when violence must be prevented. The petition must be verified and come with the affidavits of witnesses. The respondent is then notified and may file an opposition. Here the husband did file an opposition and motions, so he was heard.
• No mediation. Under the Supreme Court's rules on VAWC cases, a court hearing a petition for a protection order shall not refer the case to a mediator. The Court found this justified.
• Barangay Protection Orders. A BPO only orders the person to stop causing, or threatening to cause, physical harm to the woman or her child. The Court called this function "purely executive in nature", part of the barangay's duty to enforce the law and keep the peace. It is not judicial power.

RA 9262 is constitutional: its protection of women and their children rests on a valid classification, ex parte temporary protection orders do not violate due process, and the issuance of Barangay Protection Orders by barangay officials is an executive, not a judicial, function.

Garcia v. Drilon settled that the VAWC law is valid. A respondent cannot defeat a protection order just by saying the law discriminates against men. The Court said that whether the law should also cover men is a choice for Congress, through an amendment, and not for the courts.

The ruling also protects the speed of protection orders. Under RA 9262, a BPO from the barangay is effective for 15 days, and a TPO from the court is effective for 30 days, with a hearing set on a permanent protection order (PPO). See BPO vs TPO vs PPO and what a Barangay Protection Order is.

Illustration (invented names): Joel is served a TPO that orders him to leave the house and stay away from his wife, Rina. He argues in court that RA 9262 is void because it protects only women. After Garcia v. Drilon, that argument fails. Joel can still answer the facts in Rina's petition through the opposition the rules allow.

Later rulings built on this case. Acharon v. People explained when not giving financial support is a VAWC crime, and AAA v. BBB dealt with an affair carried on abroad. For how a case is filed, see how to file a VAWC case. For help with a real situation, see free legal help.